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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This Court has jurisdiction oves this appeal by authority 
of Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2(3)(j). Plaintiff filed this 
action in the Second Judicial District Court for Weber County. 
Both defendants filed motions to dismiss. At the hearing on those 
motions, the trial judge granted defendants' motions as to the 
first two causes of action with prejudice and as to the third 
cause of action without prejudice, giving plaintiff twenty days' 
leave to file an amended complaint. Plaintiff filed no amended 
complaint but instead filed this appeal. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court was correct in finding as a 
matter of law that the Exhibits attached to the plaintiff's 
Complaint contain no express agreement or covenant prohibiting St. 
Benedict's Hospital ("St. Benedict's") from building another 
medical office building on its property, or requiring St. 
Benedict's to give plaintiff a right of first refusal on 
construction of such a building. 
2. Whether the trial court was correct in finding as a 
matter of law that no such restrictive covenant on St. Benedict's 
use of property not covered by the agreements with plaintiff may 
be implied into the lengthy, written agreements between plaintiff 
and St. Benedict's. 
3. Whether a claim for breach of an implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing may be asserted to enforce such an 
alleged implied restrictive covenant on the use of land. 
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4. Whether the plaintiff's claim of interference with 
economic relations failed to state a claim as pleaded, and should 
be dismissed without prejudice. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
While most of the determinative provisions in this case 
are products of case law, St. Benedict's submits that the 
following provision is also determinative: 
Utah Code Annotated § 25-5-3 (1953): 
Every contract for the leasing for a longer 
period than one year, or for the sale, of any 
lands, or any interest in lands, shall be void 
unless the contract, or some note or memorandum 
thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party by 
whom the lease or sale is to be made, or by his 
lawful agent thereunto authorized in writing. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff filed this action in June, 1989, seeking 
damages and injunctive relief to enforce a claimed contractuaJ 
provision against St. Benedict's that St. Benedict's 
was bound and obligated to Plaintiff not to 
construct or permit the construction of 
additional facilities on its property for rental 
or occupancy by medical personnel practicing at 
said hospital until such time as there was no 
more available space in Plaintiff's facility and 
then only by offering Plaintiff the opportunity 
to construct and provide such service. 
Complaint 1[ 29, R. 10-11. Plaintiff variously alleged that such 
provision was an express obligation in the four documents attached 
as Exhibits to the Complaint, that it was an implied provision, 
and that it was to be enforced as part of an implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing. 
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Plaintiff also asserted a cause of action for "tortuous 
(sic) interference with Plaintiff's present and prospective 
contractual relations with others . . . " Complaint If 44, R. 15, 
claiming that St. Benedict's and the Boyer Company had tortiously 
injured plaintiff by permitting competition with plaintiff. 
Both defendants moved to dismiss. The motions were heard 
by Judge Roth on August 30, 1989. He granted the motions, 
dismissing with prejudice the first and second causes of action 
(for injunctive relief and damages, respectively, on the express 
and implied contract claims), and dismissing the tortious 
interference claim without prejudice. The Court's Order was 
entered on September 29, 1989, and plaintiffs Notice of Appeal 
was filei on October 12, 1989. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
1. St. Benedict's has leased certain land on its campus 
to plaintiff on which plaintiff has built and operates 
professional office buildings serving doctors who have privileges 
at St. Benedict's. Plaintiff attached copies of some of the 
agreements surrounding this relationship, including the agreements 
currently in effect, as exhibits to its Complaint. R. 17-59. 
2. None of those agreements restrict St. Benedict's 
ability to build other professional office buildings on other land 
on its campus, or require St. Benedict's to give plaintiff a right 
of first refusal to build or operate any new building. R. 17-59, 
205-35. 
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3. St. Benedict's has leased certain other land on its 
campus to the Boyer Company, who is building a medical office 
building on such property. R. 13. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff seeks to enforce a restrictive covenant 
prohibiting St. Benedict's from building a medical office building 
on its property without giving plaintiff a right of first refusal 
and even then only under certain other conditions relating to the 
occupancy of plaintiff's medical office buildings on St. 
Benedict's campus. That restriction simply is not present in the 
contracts between St. Benedict's and the plaintiff, and 
accordingly cannot be the subject of a breach of express contract 
claim. 
No such restrictive covenant may be implied. Implied 
covenants are generally not favored. Restrictive covenants in 
general and especially restrictive covenants on the use of lane 
are also not favored. Implied restrictive covenants on the use of 
land simply do not exist. Even express restrictive covenants are 
read narrowly by courts in Utah and other jurisdictions. 
Plaintiff has presented no cases where a court implied a 
restrictive covenant without the presence of exclusive use 
language or other expressed intention by the parties. 
The statute of frauds and the parol evidence rule also 
preclude the implication of any implied restrictive covenants such 
as plaintiff seeks in this case. It would have been easy enough 
for the parties to include the restrictions plaintiff seeks to 
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enforce in their agreements. They did not do so, and the parties' 
contracts should not be rewritten by the.Court to imply such a 
restriction. 
Plaintiff also asserts a claim related to an implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. There is even less 
reason to enforce claims for breach of such an implied covenant in 
the context of interests in real property than there is with 
respect to employment contracts. The covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing simply has no application in trying to imply a 
restriction on the use of land where there are extensive written 
documents governing the transaction. 
The plaintiff's Third Cause of Action was for 
interference with economic relations. It fails to state a claim 
as to interference with contract because it does not allege that 
any existing contracts have been breached. It also fails to state 
a claim as to interference with prospective economic relations 
because no improper means or improper purpose are alleged. The 
closest thing to an improper means any of plaintiff's memoranda 
have raised is an alleged breach of contract. Under the standards 
set forth in Utah case law, that is clearly inadequate to be an 
improper means to establish this tort. St. Benedict's has a 
strong, long-term economic interest in having ample and adequate 
first-class medical office space on and around its campus so that 
it may attract the number and quality of physicians it needs to 
practice at its hospital, as set forth in the recitals to the 
various agreements between the parties. R. 17-59. Therefore, it 
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is clear that even if plaintiff's allegations were true, St. 
Benedict's predominant purpose would be its own economic 
self-interest and not any vendetta against the plaintiff. 
Therefore, the lower court was correct in dismissing plaintiff's 
Third Cause of Action without prejudice. 
Finally, plaintiff's complaints regarding the alleged 
influence on the judge by the defense counsel, the plaintiff's 
lack of discovery (despite the fact that St. Benedict's did 
respond to plaintiff's discovery reguests prior to the motion to 
dismiss), and the plaintiff's lack of an opportunity to amend its 
first two causes of action (despite no reguest by plaintiff) are 
all without merit and provide no basis for reversing Judge Roth's 
ruling in this case. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT BELOW WAS CORRECT IN FINDING THAT THE FIRST AND 
SECOND CAUSES OF ACTION DO NOT STATE CLAIMS UPON WHICH RELIEF 
MAY BE GRANTED, 
Plaintiff's first two causes of action seek the benefit 
of a bargain which plaintiff never made. Plaintiff is trying to 
enforce a contract which never existed. Plaintiff's first two 
causes of action are for an injunction and damages and attempt to 
require St. Benedict's 
not to construct or permit the construction of 
additional facilities on its property for rental 
or occupancy by medical personnel practicing at 
said hospital until such time as there was no 
more available space in Plaintiff's facility and 
then only by offering Plaintiff the opportunity 
to construct and provide such service. 
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Complaint, 1f 29, R. 10-11. Elsewhere in the Complaint, plaintiff 
states the restriction in even broader terms, seeking to restrain 
St. Benedict's from 
proceeding with the proposed construction and 
maintenance of a professional building on Defendant 
Hospital's property unless and until Plaintiffs' 
(sic) professional buildings are completely 
occupied with reliable long term tenants, and there 
is demand and necessity reasonably (sic) to 
construct an additional facility, and then only by 
offering Plaintiff the first opportunity to 
construct said additional facility. 
Complaint 1[ 37, R. 13 (emphasis added). Whether plaintiff claims 
that this restriction is an express agreement of the parties, 
should be implied into their agreements, or somehow flows from an 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the Complaint, 
its exhibits, and the law compel the conclusion that plaintiff has 
no cause of action regarding the alleged restrictive covenant. 
A. THE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE PARTIES DO NOT CONTAIN THE 
EXPRESS PROVISION PLAINTIFF SEEKS TO ENFORCE. 
A review of the agreements between the parties shows, as 
Judge Roth found, that there are no restrictions imposed on St. 
Benedict's such as those described in the above-quoted portions of 
the Complaint. At one point at least, even plaintiff agreed with 
this position. As plaintiff stated in its Memorandum in 
Opposition to the motions to dismiss: 
It is clear in the present case that the 
lease, although containing no express provision 
that future building would be conducted between 
the two parties in the same manner, demanded an 
implied exclusive obligation in favor of 
Plaintiff if the project was to succeed. 
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Memo in Opp. at 11, R. 135 (emphasis added). For plaintiff to 
argue on appeal that an express covenant^has been violated is 
disingenuous. Moreover, it is clear that none of the many 
provisions quoted by plaintiff impose such a requirement on St. 
Benedict's. There is nothing which even begins to impose any 
restrictions on any use by St. Benedict's of its property not 
covered by the leases, let alone the many additional restrictions 
plaintiff seeks to impose. 
Where the express covenant plaintiff wishes to enforce 
does not exist, plaintiff's claims concerning the alleged breach 
of that covenant must fail as a matter of law. 
B. RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS ARE NOT FAVORED IN THE LAW AND WILL 
NOT BE IMPLIED. 
It is well established that implied covenants, generally, 
are not favored in the law. Brown v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 617 
P.2d 704, 710 (Wash. 1980); see also, In re KPT Industries, 30 
B.R. 252, 254 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983); Stern v. Dunlap Co., 228 
F.2d 939, 942 (10th Cir. 1955). 
Restrictive covenants are also not favored. See, e.g. , 
Robbins v. Finlay, 645 P.2d 623, 627 (Utah 1982) (covenants not to 
compete are enforceable if carefully drawn to protect only the 
legitimate interests of the employer). More specifically, 
restrictions on the free use of property will not be implied 
unless they necessarily follow from clear language of written 
restrictions. "[A] restrictive covenant as to property retained 
by a lessor must be evidenced by a clearly expressed intention." 
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Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Kaplan, 108 So.2d 503, 505 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (emphasis in original); see also, 49 
AM.JUR.2d, Landlord and Tenant, § 162 (1970). 
Even where (unlike this case) the instruments expressly 
contain restrictive covenants, courts will construe those 
covenants strictly, since they act as restraints on the free use 
of real estate. 
Covenants and agreements restricting the 
free use of property are strictly construed 
against limitations upon such use. Such 
restrictions will not be aided or extended by 
implication or enlarged by construction to affect 
lands not specifically described, or to grant 
rights to persons in whose favor it is not 
clearly shown such restrictions are to apply. 
Doubt will be resolved in favor of the 
unrestricted use of property. . . . 
20 AM.JUR.2d Covenants, Conditions & Restrictions, § 187 (1965) 
(footnotes omitted). 
Utah law follows this rule of strict construction. In 
Parrish v. Richards, 8 Utah 2d 419, 336 P.2d 122 (Utah 1959), the 
defendants erected a tennis court and fence which the plaintiff 
alleged was in violation of an express restrictive covenant. This 
Court held that where such restrictions are uncertain or ambiguous 
"the courts will resolve all doubts in favor of the free and 
unrestricted use of property. . . . " 336 P.2d at 123. The 
Parrish court concluded that a tennis court and fence did not 
violate a covenant expressly restricting erection of a fence, wall 
or similar structure. The Parrish court distinguished a tennis 
court and fence from sheds, barns and stores which it determined 
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were contemplated by the covenant. Ij3- See also, Freeman v. 
Gee, 18 Utah 2d 339, 423 P.2d 155, at 159, 165 (1967); Campbell v. 
Glacier Park Co., 381 F. Supp. 1243 (D. Idaho 1974) (creation of a 
recreation area within the subdivision did not violate the 
covenant of residential use). 
The strict construction imposed by the courts was further 
demonstrated in Sylvester v. hotel Pasco, 279 P. 566 (Wash. 1929), 
where the court held that an express covenant that the lessor will 
not let other property to a business competing with the lessee 
does not preclude the lessor himself from conducting such a 
competing business. 
Other courts have refused to imply the kind of 
restriction sought by plaintiff. The California Supreme Court 
held that the owner of a store containing many departments may 
lease them all to competing merchants, absent an express covenant 
to prevent him from doing so. The owner is under no implied 
obligation to give any one tenant the exclusive right to sell any 
particular product. Stockton Dry Goods Co. v. Girsh, 227 P.2d 1 
(Cal. 1951). The Stockton court found no implied restrictive 
covenant notwithstanding the fact that there had always been only 
one shoe department in the store. 
St. Benedict's, like the lessor in Stockton, is under no 
implied obligation to provide the plaintiff with the exclusive 
right to provide offices for the hospital staff. St. Benedict's 
never agreed to grant such a right; there is simply no basis to 
imply such a covenant and no precedent for such an implication. 
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See generally, Anno., 22 A.L.R.2d 1466 (without language showing 
intention to grant an exclusive privilege to carry on the 
particular business, the lessor is under no implied obligation to 
not compete with the tenant or to not permit other property owned 
by him to be used for such competition). 
Despite plaintiff's claim that its claims are "not 
novel," Appellant's Brief at 23, none of the three cases plaintiff 
cites supports its claim. In both Keating v. Preston, 42 
Cal.App.2d 110, 108 P.2d 479 (1940), and Belvedere Hotel Co. v. 
Williams, 137 Md. 665, 113 A.335 (1921), there was language which 
showed the parties' intention to grant an exclusive right to the 
lessee. Despite ample opportunity, plaintiff has not and cannot 
show any language from the agreements in this case which grant an 
exclusive right to the plaintiff to be the sole operator of 
medical office space around the St. Benedict's Hospital. In 
Carter v. Adler, 291 P.2d 111 (Cal. App. 1956), the lessee was 
granted "exclusive rights on Grocery . . . at 6127 Sepulveda 
Boulevard. . . ." 291 P.2d at 112. The court prevented the 
lessor from going forward with another supermarket at the same 
address. Without a grant of exclusive rights, plaintiff here has 
no claim. 
Plaintiff's argument at pp. 21-22 of its Brief that since 
the leases impose restrictions on plaintiff, plaintiff should 
"achieve its reasonable expectations flowing from their contracts" 
through enforcement of implied restrictions is baseless. Any 
expectations plaintiff has which are not grounded on express 
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provisions of the leases are prima facie not reasonable. All of 
the restrictions on the plaintiff are express--they were part of 
the basis of the bargain, just as was the nominal one dollar per 
year rent plaintiff must pay. The reason for the lease's 
existence was to provide St. Benedict's with the type of building 
described. If plaintiff nad wished to impose the restrictions it 
now seeks on St. Benedict's, it could have negotiated for them. 
The general contract cases cited by plaintiff have no 
application to this situation. In Nixon and Nixon v. John New & 
Associates, Inc., 641 P.2d 144 (Utah 1982), the quoted language 
dealt with whether a contract had been formed/ and whether the 
lack of a term as to time of performance precluded specific 
performance. It did not deal with implying anything into the 
contract other than recognizing that the general rule requires 
"completion within a reasonable time under all circumstances." 
Id. at 146. There is no analogous "general rule" mandating 
implied restrictive covenants on the use of land; indeed the rule 
is just the opposite. Similarly, Quality Performance Lines v. 
Yoho Automotive, Inc., 609 P.2d 1340 (Utah 1980), addresses when a 
contract can be implied from the parties' conduct under Article 
Two of the UCC, not whether to imply restrictive covenants on the 
use of land. Finally, in DuBois v. Nye, 584 P.2d 823 (Utah 1978), 
the Court refused to read an express covenant allocating the risk 
of loss between the buyer and seller of a house to indemnify the 
defendant for her own negligence. That case can hardly be argued 
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for the position that a restrictive covenant should be implied in 
spite of the parties' extensive written agreements. 
Here, plaintiff seeks to enforce an implied restrictive 
covenant. The restriction sought to be enforced in this case is 
not "carefully drawn," nor is it evidenced by a "clearly expressed 
intention." It is not expressed at all. This restriction is not 
merely uncertain or ambiguous like the restriction this Court 
refused to enforce in Parrish, it is nonexistent. Plaintiff's 
counsel has attempted to come up with reasons why the restrictions 
it seeks to enforce mignt be desirable to the plaintiff. Those 
are reasons the plaintiff should have bargained and negotiated to 
include the restrictions in the leases, they are not excuses to 
rewrite the parties' agreement. 
As stated in Union Pacific Railroad Company v. El Paso 
Natural Gas Company, 17 Utah 2d 255, 408 P.2d 910 (1965): 
If it had been the intent of the parties 
that the defendant should indemnify the plaintiff 
against the latter*s negligent acts, it would 
have been easy enough to use that very language 
and to thus make that intent clear and 
unmistakable, which was not done. 
408 P.2d at 914. There, the Court refused to permit a broad 
reading of an express indemnity clause to reach a disfavored 
result—indemnification for a party's own negligence. Here, 
plaintiff also seeks a disfavored result—a serious restriction on 
the use of land not even covered by the agreements between the 
parties. Moreover, plaintiff seeks to imply it out of nothing, 
not merely read an existing restriction broadly. Just as in Union 
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Pacific, it would have been easy enough to use clear language to 
express the restrictions plaintiff seeks.to enforce. That was not 
done, and the Court should not undertake to do it for the parties 
where they did not do so themselves. 
C. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM VIOLATES THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
Utah law requires that any interest in real property be 
in writing. Utah Code Annotated § 25-5-1 (1987). With regard to 
leases, the Utah Code provides: 
Every contract for the leasing for a longer 
period than one year, or for the sale, of any 
land, or any interest in lands, shall be void 
unless the contract, or some not or memorandum 
thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party by 
whom the lease or sale is to be made, or by his 
lawful agent thereunto authorized in writing. 
Utah Code Annotated § 25-5-3 (1953) (emphasis added). 
The plain language of the statute indicates that an 
interest such as plaintiff claims cannot arise by implication, but 
must be in writing. The statute exists to avoid claims such as 
those raised in this case, and precludes plaintiff from obtaining 
any recovery. 
D. THE PARTIES' INTENT IS DETERMINED FROM THE FINAL 
AGREEMENT. 
Under the parol evidence rule, the written lease 
agreement is the final and complete agreement. See, e.g., Lamb v. 
Bangart, 525 P.2d 602 (Utah 1974) (written agreement for sale of 
livestock is an integrated contract); E.A. Strout Western Realty 
Agency, Inc. v. Broderick, 522 P.2d 144 (Utah 1974) (written 
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agreement to pay real estate commission cannot be modified by 
parol evidence where terms are clear, definite and unambiguous). 
Moreover, the intent of the parties is determined from 
the final written agreement and not from prior or contemporaneous 
conversations, representations or statements. In Commercial Bldg. 
Corp. v. Blair, 565 P.2d 776 (Utah 1977), this Court held that: 
The rule in the State of Utah, as elsewhere, 
is that parol evidence may be admitted to show 
the intent of the parties if the language of a 
written contract is vague and uncertain. On the 
other hand, such evidence cannot be permitted to 
vary or contradict the plain language of the 
contract. 
The parties' intention is to be determined 
from the final agreement executed by them and not 
from prior or contemporaneous conversations, 
representations or statements. 
Id. at 778 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). 
In the instant case, the parties executed a final written 
agreement which makes no reference to the covenant that the 
plaintiff contends should be implied. There is no ambiguity; the 
covenant does not exist. Plaintiff cannot introduce parol 
evidence to vary the agreement by adding unfavored terms to an 
agreement that is presumptively final and complete. 
E. THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING IS 
NOT SUFFICIENT TO CREATE A RESTRICTIVE COVENANT. 
Plaintiff also argues that St. Benedict's has somehow 
violated an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. St. 
Benedict's is aware of no Utah cases finding such a covenant in a 
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lease of real property. Even if such an implied covenant existed, 
there is no indication that its violation would be actionable. 
The only situation where a cause of action on such an implied 
covenant has been permitted in Utah is in the context of a 
first-party insurance bad faith claim. See, e.g., Beck v. Farmers 
Ins. Exchange, 701 P.2d 79b (Utah 1985). This Court recently 
declined to permit such a cause of action in the context of a 
contract of employment. Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 
1033 (Utah 1989); Caldwell v. Ford, Bacon & Davis Utah, Inc., 777 
P.2d 483, 485 (Utah 1989); Loose v. Nature-All Corporation, 122 
U.A.R. 5 (Utah 1989). 
In the instant case, even if a covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing is implicit in the plaintiff's lease, there is no 
authority to permit the Court to construe such an implied covenant 
to impose a restrictive covenant such as plaintiff claims here. 
See, e.g., Stockton, supra, 227 P.2d at 3 ("A restrictive covenant 
as to property retained by a . . . lessor must be evidenced by a 
clearly expressed intention."). Indeed, no court has ever 
stretched the concept so liberally as plaintiff urges. 
Plaintiff's attempt to distinguish the employment cases 
on the ground that employers * long-settled reliance on the 
doctrine of employment-at-will somehow precludes the possibility 
of a breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
claim flies in the face of both the analysis in the Court's 
opinions on the issue and the existence of significant, 
well-established, and long-standing doctrines which militate 
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against permitting such a cause of action in this situation. 
Justice Zimmerman's opinion in Berube is*the only place any of the 
majority opposing the recognition of this claim in employment 
cases discusses their rationale. That opinion clearly shows that 
his reluctance centers on the uncertainty such a claim would 
impose on employers trying to terminate employees, not the 
employers' reliance on employment-at-will. 771 P.2d at 
1051-1052. Similarly, recognizing a claim for breach of an 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the context of 
real property would subject everyone with interests in land, and 
especially landlords, to extreme uncertainty in determining 
whether their leases and other instruments reflecting interests in 
land medn what they say or can be twisted to impose extensive, 
im.plied restrictions such as plaintiff seeks in this case. 
Moreover, to the extent employers' reliance on 
employment-at-will is a basis for refusing to permit implied 
covenant claims in that context; the existence of the 
well-established doctrines against implying covenants, against 
reading even express restrictive covenants broadly, against 
restricting the use of land, the statute of frauds, and the parol 
evidence rule all clearly show that it is inappropriate to permit 
such a cause of action in this case. As Justice Durham indicated 
in her opinion in Berube, claims for violation of covenants of 
good faith and fair dealing should be used "sparingly and with 
caution." 771 P.2d at 1047. There is no support for the 
contention that an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
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can be construed to create a restrictive covenant in a real estate 
lease, and so the lower court's Order should be affirmed. 
In sum, there is absolutely no support for plaintiff's 
claim. There is no language in any of the agreements to support 
its claim that any express covenant arose, and no implied covenant 
may be imposed due to the statute of frauds, the parol evidence 
rule, and well-established canons of construction of conveyances 
of interests in real estate. Moreover, restrictive covenants are 
not favored in the law, and are strictly construed even when 
explicitly stated. There is no basis for •"hem to be read into the 
agreement between the parties by the Court. Finally, there is no 
authority for plaintiff's claim that an implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing would give rise to a restrictive covenant 
as plaintiff asserts. While it is doubtful that any cause of 
action for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing lies in this situation, it is clear that under the 
restrictive view of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing adopted by this Court, it would be improper to read a 
disfavored restrictive covenant into the lease through the 
operation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
II. THE LOWER COURT WAS CORRECT IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S THIRD 
CAUSE OF ACTION BECAUSE IT DOES NOT ESTABLISH INTENTIONAL 
INTERFERENCE WITH ECONOMIC RELATIONS AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Plaintiff's Third Cause of Action attempts to allege 
claims of intentional interference with contractual relations and 
intentional interference with prospective economic advantage 
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concerning the possibility that another building will be available 
for professional office space on the St. Benedict's campus. 
A. NO CLAIM OF INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT MAY LIE WHEN 
NO EXISTING CONTRACT IS IMPAIRED. 
The tort of interference with contract was defined in 
Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982), as 
conduct which 'intentionally and improperly 
interferes with the performance of a contract 
. . . between another and a third person by 
inducing or otherwise causing the third person 
not to perform the contract.' 
657 P.2d at 301 (citations omitted, quoting Restatement (Second) 
of Torts § 766 (1979)). 
For an interference with contract claim to lie, it is 
essential that the performance of an existing contract be 
impaired. There is no allegation in plaintiff's Complaint that 
any existing lease between plaintiff and its tenants was breached, 
or that the performance under any of those leases was in any way 
impaired. Plaintiff's allegations merely go to the claim that its 
ability to renew leases with its tenants was somehow damaged. 
Without any allegation that St. Benedict's has somehow interfered 
with the performance of an existing contract, no claim for 
interference with contract can lie. 
B. PLAINTIFF FAILS TO ALLEGE A CLAIM OF INTERFERENCE WITH 
PROSPECTIVE ECONOMIC RELATIONS. 
The tort of intentional interference with prospective 
economic relations was defined in the Leigh Furniture case as 
requiring the plaintiff to prove 
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(1) that the defendant intentionaLly interfered 
with the plaintiff's existing or potential 
economic relations, (2) for an improper purpose 
or by improper means, (3) causing injury to the 
plaintiff. 
657 P.2d at 304. In this case, plaintiff's Complaint fails to 
establish the second element as a matter of law, mandating the 
dismissal of plaintiff's Third Cause of Action. 
Plaintiff argues that its allegation that St. Benedict's 
improperly solicited plaintiff's tenants in breach of its 
contractual obligations is sufficient to meet this element. 
Appellant's Brief at 24. First, it should be noted that contrary 
to Appellant's claim, plaintiff's Complaint does not allege that 
St. Benedict's alleged solicitations were Ln breach of its 
contract with plaintiff. Complaint § 41, R. 14. Even if it did, 
the agreements between the parties clearly do not include the 
restrictions plaintiff wants to enforce, and so have not been 
breached. Moreover, even if there had been a breach, plaintiff's 
Complaint still fails to state a claim. 
1. No Improper Purpose Exists Due to St. Benedict's 
Legitimate Economic Interest. 
This Court in Leigh Furniture held that in that case no 
claim could be upheld using the improper purpose prong, even 
though there was "substantial evidence that the Leigh Corporation 
deliberately injured Isom's economic relations." 657 P.2d at 
308. The Court required that Leigh's "predominant purpose" be to 
injure Isom and instead found that the 
injury was not an end in itself. It was an 
intermediate step toward achieving the 
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long-range financial goal of profitably-
reselling the building free of Isom's interest. 
Because that economic interest seems to have 
been controlling, we must conclude that the 
evidence in this case would not support a jury 
finding that the Corporation's predominant 
purpose was to injure or ruin Isom's business 
merely for the sake of injury alone. 
Id. at 308. 
In this case, the agreements plaintiff attached to its 
Complaint clearly establish the economic interest of St. 
Benedict's in having an adequate amount of first-class 
professional office space on or near its campus to serve admitting 
physicians. Leigh Furniture dictates that the improper purpose 
prong is insufficient to state a claim due to the long-range, 
legitimate economic interest St. Benedict's has in making ample, 
first-class office space available to its doctors. As this Court 
Stated, the improper purpose alternative 
takes the long view of the defendant's conduct, 
allowing objectionable short-run purposes to be 
eclipsed by legitimate long-range economic 
motivation. Otherwise, much competitive commercial 
activity . . . could become tortious. In the rough 
and tumble of the marketplace, competitors 
inevitably damage one another in the struggle for 
personal advantage. The law offers no remedy for 
those damages—even if intentional—because they 
are an inevitable byproduct of competition. 
Problems inherent in proving motivation or purpose 
make it prudent for commercial conduct to be 
regulated for the most part by the improper means 
alternative, which typically requires only a 
showing of particular conduct. 
657 P.2d at 307. Similarly, the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
states that interference with prospective contractual relations is 
not improper if Mhis purpose is at least in part to advance his 
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interest in competing with the other." Section 768(d) (emphasis 
added). Plaintiff's Complaint does not and cannot allege that St. 
Benedict's sole or even predominate purpose in doing the acts 
alleged is to injure plaintiff. 
2. No Improper Means Are Alleged. 
The requirement for showing improper means is 
well-defined in Leigh Furniture, which stated that "such acts are 
illegal or tortious in themselves and hence are clearly 'improper* 
means of interference." 657 P.2d at 308. The only improper means 
plaintiff refers to here are that the defendants acted "wilfully, 
knowingly in concert with each other." Memo. In Opp. at p. 15, 
R. 139. That claim, even if amended to allege a breach of 
contract between St. Benedict's and plaintiff, falls far short of 
being illegal or tortious in itself, and clearly is not "contrary 
to law," a "violation of statutes, regulations, or recognized 
common-law rules," or "violence, threats or other intimidation, 
deceit or misrepresentation, bribery, unfounded litigation, 
defamation, or disparaging falsehood." 657 P.2d at 308. 
Plaintiff has failed to allege any act by St. Benedict's rising to 
the level necessary to establish a claim of improper means, and so 
has failed to adequately please a claim of intentional 
interference with economic relations. Therefore, the Court below 
was correct in dismissing plaintiff's Third Cause of Action 
without prejudice. 
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III. NONE OF PLAINTIFF'S OTHER ARGUMENTS MANDATE REVERSING THE 
ORDER OF THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, 
Plaintiff touches on several other items in its brief, 
but none of them provide any basis for the reversal of this 
decision. First, plaintiff asserts that Judge Roth considered 
material not properly before him in reaching his conclusion. The 
two points plaintiff relies on for this claim are that counsel for 
defendants argued that there were no express provisions of the 
contractual agreements breached and that the court allegedly held 
that "the plaintiff was •sophisticated1". Appellant's Brief at 
26. As to the first point, it remains St. Benedict's position 
that no express provisions of the leases provide the restrictions 
and remedies plaintiff seeks in this action. Moreover, the 
transcript clearly shows that Judge Roth's ruling that there was 
no specific language to require St. Benedict's to provide the 
plaintiff a right of first refusal on any future medical office 
building was based on the arguments, the contracts, the Complaint, 
and the memoranda. R. 205-34. The fact that Judge Roth agreed, 
as would anyone else reading the agreements in question, that the 
express provision plaintiff seeks to enforce in this case simply 
does not exist does not mean the judge was somehow improperly 
influenced by defense counsel. 
As to plaintiff's second point, the judge did not hold 
that plaintiff was "sophisticated." As a review of the transcript 
shows, he indicated that the contracts were sophisticated. He 
stated: 
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There is no claim that the parties to this 
contract entered into the contract unknowingly or 
under duress, or that there was unequal 
bargaining power on one side or*the other. The 
contracts are detailed. They are sophisticated. 
It appears to me if that's what the parties 
intended, that's what they could have said. 
R. 205-35. The reference to "sophisticated" clearly must be to 
the detailed contracts, and that it is an inference which is 
properly drawn from having read through the detailed and lengthy 
contracts involved. St. Benedict's would also note that 
plaintiff's complaint about defense counsel's reference to the 
fact that the contracts were drawn up with the involvement of 
attorneys is reflected in the record by the fact that Exhibit "D" 
to the Complaint, R. 38-59, shows that it was mailed to St. 
Benedict's Development Company in care of its attorney at the Van 
Cott firm. 
Plaintiff also complains that it was somehow prejudiced 
by not being permitted to pursue discovery to remedy its fatally 
defective Complaint. St. Benedict's would point out for the Court 
that it responded to the discovery requests submitted by the 
plaintiff on August 8, 1989, more than three weeks prior to the 
date of the oral argument on the motions to dismiss. R. 119. 
Even though St. Benedict's had responded to plaintiff's discovery, 
plaintiff used none of that information in response to the motion 
to dismiss or at the hearing, nor did it use any information 
provided in discovery to amend its Third Cause of Action as it was 
given leave to do. Instead, plaintiff chose to go forward with 
this appeal. Clearly plaintiff has had every opportunity to 
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make use of any information it learned from St. Benedict's in 
discovery, but it has chosen not to do so. 
Moreover, the deficiencies in plaintiff's Complaint are 
not deficiencies which require discovery to be remedied. 
Plaintiffs first two causes of action simply fail to state a 
claim upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiffs Third Cause 
of Action does not adequately allege the elements of the claim 
asserted. While plaintiff mav'not involve other parties in 
baseless lawsuits so it car, pursue discovery to try to determine 
whether any meritorious claims exist, if plaintiff had a good 
faith basis for as,, Jerting any improper means or improper purpose 
on the part of g^. Benedict's, it could have done so in amending 
its Comria-Lnt# Plaintiff chose not to do, and there is clearly no 
eJiiror in the lower court's dismissal of that cause of action as 
pleaded. 
Finally, it should be noted that plaintiff's claim that 
the lower court should have provided it an opportunity to amend 
its first two causes of action is specious. First, there is no 
evidence that Judge Roth denied any motion to amend which 
plaintiff made. After the judge ruled, counsel for the plaintiff 
requested leave to amend as to the Third Cause of Action. 
R. 205-36. That motion was granted, but plaintiff chose not to 
take advantage of it, and instead filed this appeal. Plaintiff 
did not seek leave to amend as to the first two causes of action. 
In fact, plaintiff requested that the Court certify its ruling so 
plaintiff could appeal immediately. R. 205-36. Plaintiffs 
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argument concerning amendments is a red herring and none of the 
cases it cites are on point here. 
It is also clear that there is no requirement that the 
Court engage in actions which are a waste of time. Plaintiff's 
first two causes of action did not suffer from inadequate 
pleading; they are not proper claims. The restrictive covenant 
they seek cannnot be enforced through any implication, and it 
simply is not present in any of thS, leases to be enforced as an 
express provision. As was stated in i^ owe v. Sorenson Research 
Co., Inc., 779 P.2d 668, 669 (Utah 1989), dismissals under Rule 
12(b)(6) will be affirmed "if it is apparent t^at a s a matter of 
law, the plaintiff could not recover under the fac*^ alleged." 
Here, under the facts alleged in the Complaint and the c T ^ t r a c t s 
attached to it, plaintiff cannot enforce the restriction it set?,!fs' 
and cannot obtain an injunction or recover damages for it as a 
matter of law. No amount of amendment of the claims asserted in 
the first two causes of action would yield a cognizable claim for 
relief, and accordingly, the lower court was correct in dismissing 
them with prejudice. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court was correct in ruling that no express 
restrictive covenant such as plaintiff seeks to enforce exists in 
the agreements between the parties and that no such covenant may 
be implied. It was also correct in finding that the plaintiff's 
Third Cause of Action did not adequately state a claim of tortious 
interference with economic advantage. For all of the foregoing 
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reasons, Defendant St. Benedict's Hospital requests that the Court 
affirm the Order of the Second District Court. 
DATED this J 6?f day of February, 1990. 
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